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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
deduction if there is a real debt. Before the "business purpose"
doctrine can be extended to the interest sphere, Congress must
promulgate concrete guidelines for adherence for both the taxpayer
and the Government.
COPYRIGHT AS COLLATERAL IN A SECURED TRANSACTION t
Introduction
The present Copyright Act' is an anachronism. The advent
of modern means of diversified communications has greatly increased
the economic importance of the copyright, for the copyright owner
is no longer limited to the sale of reprinted copies as the only
commercially feasible means of realizing economic gain. However,
if the various media of communication are to be fully exploited
by the copyright owner, the copyright and its divisible parts must
be accessible to the modern vehicles of commercial transferability.
In modern commercial practice, businesses have become com-
pletely reliant on financing, since the size and complex form of
contemporary business have rendered the cash system commercially
infeasible. Financing is a system by which a financier advances
the necessary capital to a business in exchange for a security interest
in its assets. It has become the mainstay of modern business pro-
cedure. In order to protect both the financier and the debtor, an
extensive but burdensome legal system of secured financing has
developed. This system has been recently refined and co-ordinated
by the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter referred to as the
Code) which has been adopted by a majority of the states.
The amount of capital that a creditor is willing to advance
to a business will depend on the reliability of the business and the
value of the assets given as collateral. Those businesses which own
copyrights or a divisible part of copyrights constitute a substantial
portion of the business community. The ability of these businesses
to effectively offer a copyright to a creditor as security for his
loan will depend on the stability of this asset. Stability depends
upon the answers to the following questions: (1) are the statutory
rights which inure to a copyright adequate to enable feasible
t Winner of First Place in the 1964 Nathan Burkan Memorial Compe-
tition, St. John's University School of Law.
117 U.S.C. (1952).
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exploitation; and (2) can the creditor reasonably protect his security
interest in the copyright?
The purpose of this article is to explore and analyze the
problems that would be encountered by a creditor who accepted a
copyright as part of the security for his loan.
Applicability of the Copyright Act to Copyright Mortgages,
Section 28 of the Copyright Act provides that:
Copyright secured under this title or previous copyright laws of the
United States may be assigned, granted, or mortgaged by an instrument
in writing signed by the proprietor of the copyright, or may be be-
queathed by will.2
However, section 30 which provides for recording states that:
Every assignment of copyright shall be recorded in the copyright office
within three calendar months after its execution in the United States or
within six calendar months after its execution without the limits of the
United States, in default of which it shall be void as against any sub-
sequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without
notice, whose assignment has been duly recorded.a
Therefore, although section 28 explicitly provides that a copyright
may be mortgaged, section 30 is ambiguous as to the recording of
such mortgage with the Copyright Office and the effect that a
recorded mortgage has in relation to other transfers of the mort-
gaged copyright.
Unfortunately, legislative history, is not illuminating as to the
congressional intent behind the enactment of section 30- and in
view of this lack of definitive intent and the paucity of judicial
decisions construing sections 28 and 30, the law in this area can
be considered as being far from settled. Uncertainty exists with
regard to:
a) Whether federal filing is necessary to perfect a mortgage;
and
b) If federal filing is necessary to perfect a mortgage, what
are the rights and priorities of the mortgagee?
Congress, pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the United States
Constitution, has the power to create a federal copyright and there-
fore the power to provide the manner in which the copyright may
be transferred.5 However, the mere fact that Congress has been
217 U.S.C. §28 (1952).
3 17 U.S.C. §30 (1952).
4H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1909).
5U.S. CowsT. art. I, §8, cl. 8: "To promote the Progress of Science
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empowered to prescribe the requirements for alienability of a
copyright does not of itself exclude the states' power to legislate
in this area.6 Nevertheless, it should be noted that if Congress so
desired, it could, by proper legislation, pre-empt the field.
The first problem to be resolved, therefore, is whether Congress
by enacting Sections 28 and 30 of the Copyright Act has pre-empted
the field by providing a comprehensive scheme which precludes
state regulation. In the case of Allen v. Riley,7 the Supreme Court
was confronted with the problem of whether Congress had pre-
empted the field of patents transferability by the enactment of a
provision which stated:
Every patent or any interest therein shall be assignable in law by an
instrument in writing, and the patentee or his assigns or legal representa-
tives may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right under his
patent to the whole or any specified part of the United States. An
assignment, grant, or conveyance shall be void as against any subsequent
purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice,
unless it is recorded in the Patent Office within three months from the
date thereof.9
The Court held that this provision was not so comprehensive as
to preclude the states from legislating on the subject, providing
that any such legislation was neither inconsistent with, nor opposed
to, the federal statute.'0 Since the scope of that patent provision
was at least as broad as the provisions of sections 28 and 30, it
would appear that the Supreme Court's statement, allowing state
legislation consistent with the federal schemes, applies to copyright
transfers as well. However, the state provision before the Court
in Allen did not regulate patent nortgages, but merely required
the vendor of a patent to file a copy of the letters of patent and
his right to vend. Therefore, although the case may be cited for
the general proposition that sections 28 and 30 do not exclude all
state regulation in the area, it is not authority for the more
definitive statement that copyright mortgages are not within the
exclusive realm of federal jurisdiction. Thus, because Allen can be
distinguished factually, and because it is inconclusive authority as
to copyright mortgages, the basic question as to whether Congress
has pre-empted the field remains.
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Ibid. See
generally Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); Welsbach Light
Co. v. Cohn, 181 Fed. 122 (2d Cir. 1910).
6Allen v. Riley, 203 U.S. 347 (1906); Cookson v. Louis Marx & Co.,
23 F. Supp. 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
7203 U.S. 347 (1906).
s Congress' power to enact patent legislation is derived from the same
source which gives it the power to enact copyright legislation. Furthermore,
both rights are intangible in nature.
9 16 Stat. 203 (1870). The current counterpart is 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1952).
10 Allen v. Riley, mipra note 6, at 357.
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In the case of In re Leslie-Judge Co.," decided by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, the court, by way of dictum, stated that
a copyright could be mortgaged only under the federal copyright
law.12 In Security-First Nat'l Bank v. Republic Pictures Corp.,13
District Judge Yankwich stated that he considered the Leslie state-
ment correct and hence would follow it.'4 He rejected the argument
that the Leslie conclusion was induced by the fact that under New
York law there could not be a chattel mortgage of an intangible.
However, this opinion was reversed by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals and, although the reversing court did not expressly
contradict the decision, it may be surmised that the opinion is
doubtful authority.
The Leslie dictum may be further questioned by referring to
the official comments of the Code which state that:
Although the Federal Copyright Act contains provisions permitting the
mortgage of a copyright and for the recording of an assignment of a
copyright (17 U.S.C. §§ 28, 30) such a statute would not seem to contain
sufficient provisions regulating the rights of the parties and third parties
to exclude security interests in copyrights from the provisions of this
Article.' 5
The fact that the Code comments make specific reference to the
recording of a mortgaged copyright in a state filing office indicates
that both the drafters of the Code and the states that have adopted
it feel that the Leslie statement is not binding.
One highly authoritative article presents the opinion that Con-
gress has pre-empted the field with respect to copyright mortgages.-I
It justifies this conclusion by analogizing the Copyright Act to the
Ship Mortgage Act.1 7 The cases cited under the Ship Mortgage
Act hold that federal recordation, under the act, supercedes and
excludes state laws and therefore, only federal filing is determina-
tive.'3 However, a comparison of the Ship Mortgage Act with
Sections 28 and 30 of the Copyright Act indicates that the two
acts are clearly distinguishable, and, therefore, the cases decided
under the Ship Mortgage Act are completely inapplicable to the
Copyright Act.
The Ship Mortgage Act, unlike the Copyright Act, expressly
provides not only for the filing of mortgages, but also describes
1272 Fed. 886 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 256 U.S. 704 (1921).
12 Id. at 888.
Is 97 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1951), rev'd, 197 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1952).
'14 Id. at 368.
25 UCC § 9-104, comment
16 Kaplan, Literary And Artistic Properly (Including Copyright) As Se-
curity: Problems Facing The Lender, 19 LAW & CONhMP. PRoB. 254, 260-61(1954).
:L 41 Stat. 1000, 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-84 (1958).
18 Aldrich v. Aetna Co., 75 U.S. 491 (1869); White's Bank v. Smith,
74 U.S. 646 (1868).
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the effect that such filing or its failure will have as against other
parties. 19 The Copyright Act, on the other hand, is silent as to
whether the mortgage has to be filed and the effect of such filing
upon other interests.
The proposition that section 30 applies to mortgages and,
therefore, is comprehensive enough to exclude any state filing
provisions, seems implicit in the wording of that section. 20 It
provides that an assignment, unless recorded within prescribed time,
"shall be void against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for
a valuable consideration, without notice, whose assignment has been
duly recorded." 2 (Emphasis added.) If we suppose that the word
"assignment" includes mortgages, as the sentence structure implies,
then it may be concluded that Congress did have the intent to make
section 30 applicable to mortgages, to the exclusion of state laws.
If this is true, then the failure to expressly state this intent may be
attributable to poor draftsmanship. To lend support to the argument
that the word "assignment" includes mortgages, there are several
early cases which hold that a mortgage of a patent is considered
an assignment. The leading case supporting this doctrine is Water-
man v. Mackenzie.2 2  The reasoning of this Court indicates an
adherence to the old common-law doctrine that a mortgage was a
transfer of title subject to revestiture upon payment of the debt,
rather than a lien transaction. However, the modern view of the
nature of a mortgage generally disfavors the title transfer theory,
accepting instead the lien theory.23 Thus, the support the Waterman
doctrine gives to the argument that "assignment" includes mortgages
is probably weak in the light of modern standards.
The argument that "assignment" includes mortgages may be
questioned on several further grounds. First, it is evident from
the comprehensive provisions of the Ship Mortgage Act that Con-
gress had the experience and the knowledge to draft and enact a
statute providing for a federal system of filing copyright mortgages
if it so desired that federal filing should be exclusive. Second, the
position taken by the Copyright Office further weakens this ar-
gument. In the Rules and Regulations of the Copyright Office,
Section 201.4 states that "assignments of copyright and other
papers relative to copyrights will be recorded. .. 24 (Emphasis
1941 Stat. 1000, 46 U.S.C. §921 (1958).
20 See Latman, The Recordation of Copyright Assigninent And Licenses,
(Copyright Revision Report No. 19, p. 6, 1960), Sucomm. ox PA TENTS,
TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS, SEN. COMM. o THE JuDIcIARY, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 115 (Comm. Print 1960). (Hereafter referred to as Comm.
Print).
2117 U.S.C. §30 (1952).
22138 U.S. 252 (1890).
2336 Am. JuR. Mortgages (1943); 1 JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND
CONDITIONAL SALES (Bower's ed. 1933).
2437 C.F.R. § 201.4 (1963).
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added.) As an example of "other papers" the regulation cites
mortgages. 2r Thus, it may be concluded that the Copyright Office
itself does not believe that the term "assignment" includes mortgages
so as to make section 30 applicable to mortgages.
As further evidence that Congress did not intend section 30
to apply to mortgages so as to exclude state filing provisions, refer-
ence may be made to a circular published by the Copyright Office.2 6
This circular, in discussing sections 28 and 30, states that "the
law also provides that assignments of copyrights should be recorded
in the Copyright Office. This requirement apparently does not apply
to other types of transfers. . . ." (Emphasis added.) The circular
goes on to list mortgages as "other types of transfers," and does
not include them within the term "assignment."
Another factor tending to show that Sections 28 and 30 of the
present Copyright Act do not pre-empt the area is the attempt by
the drafters of the newly proposed Copyright Act to resolve the
existing conflict by including a provision for pre-emption by the
federal law.27 The newly proposed Copyright Act will prove a good
barometer of congressional intent, for if the proposed section, pro-
viding for federal pre-emption is accepted as new law, the legal
profession will have to conclude that Congress has intended to
pre-empt the area of filing. If the section is rejected, Congress
cannot be said to have intended to pre-empt the field.
At present, the arguments in support of the view that Congress
has not precluded state legislation by section 30 appear to outweigh
the arguments advanced in support of the view that federal law
has pre-empted the field. However, the lack of definitive authority
in this area and the magnitude of the conflict indicate that the
problem is ripe for judicial determination. In order to predict the
outcome of a court's adjudication, we must turn to those factors
which the courts will undoubtedly consider.28
Problems Posed by the Copyright Act
A. Grace Periods
The primary purpose of a recording statute is to provide con-
structive notice to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers 9
Statutes which provide for recordation of transfers offer a means
25 Otherwise there would be no need for the Copyright Office to list
mortgages in the group with "other papers."
26 Copyright Office Circular 10 (1962).
27 H.R. 11947, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 19 (1964). (Hereafter referred
to as the Bill). The wording of this section, however, does not clearly
provide for federal pre-emption and if enacted it may create many problems.
28 Ibid.
2945 Am. Jua. Records & Recording Laws §81 (1943).
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by which a potential transferee can ascertain the state of the title
of his transferor. In order to have an effective recording system
it is essential that all transferees be required to file an instrument
which will give notice of their rights. To accomplish this, the
recording statutes impose upon the transferee, as a condition pre-
cedent to the validity of his transfer as against a subsequent trans-
feree, the obligation of recording his transfer. Section 30 is such
a provision. However, in parts it is antiquated and ambiguous.
For example, section 30 allows for grace periods in which to
file, viz., three months after execution in the United States, six
months after execution without the United States. The effect of
the grace provisions is that a prior assignee will prevail over a
subsequent assignee without knowledge, even though he recorded
first, so long as the prior assignee records within his grace period.
Thus, any potential transferee, when he searches the record, cannot
be certain at the time of the search that the transferor is the actual
proprietor of the rights he is conveying.30 The grace provision
was common in early recordation statutes because of the lack of
speedy means for transmission of documents to the recording office.
However, the advent of modern communication has alleviated the
need for these provisions.3 1 Although Mr. Latman, in his revision
report on the recordation of assignments recognized this point,3 2
the new Copyright Bill still retaing a grace period for filing.3 3 The
bill, however, would shorten the grace periods to two months from
execution within the United States and four months from execution
without the United States. 4
The ambiguities that section 30 creates are numerous. One,
for example, is the failure expressly to state whether the grace
period applies to the "subsequent purchaser or mortgagee." In
other words, must the subsequent transferee record his conveyance
within the specified grace period after execution in order to prevail
over a prior transferee who has failed to record within his specified
grace period? Section 30 states only: "whose assignment has been
duly recorded." Mr. Latman considers that a provision requiring a
subsequent assignee to file within the grace period is unnecessary.5
However, Professor Nimmer, in his treatise on copyrights, states
that a court in construing the word "duly" in section 30, would
hold that the filing within the time requirement would be necessary
30 The uncertainty with regard to the debtor's title would require the
creditor to withhold his consideration for a period of six months after the
execution and filing of the security agreement. This, however, is com-
mercially unrealistic.
14 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.32 (Casner ed. 1952); Latman,
.-upra note 20, at 16, Comm. Print, at 121.32 Latman, .mpra note 20, at 16-17, Comm. Print, at 121-22.
s3 Bill § 18 (e).
s4 Ibid.2 5 Latman, mtpra note 20, at 15, Comm. Print, at 120.
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for a subsequent assignee to prevail.3 6 The proposed act alleviates
this problem by providing that if the transferee of the prior executed
transfer fails to record within the grace period, then whoever
records first prevails; however, if the subsequent assignee files
before a late-filing prior assignee, he must be a good-faith transferee,
without notice of a prior transfer for valuable consideration.37
B. Common-Law Copyrights, Uncompleted Works, Divisible Rights
The present Copyright Act is inapplicable unless the statutory
procedure for copyrighting has been properly followed. Therefore,
section 30 would not apply to a common-law copyright or to an
unfinished or contemplated work.3 This creates problems which
have practical import with respect to motion picture financing. The
standard motion picture financing agreement includes as collateral
the motion picture rights, the screenplay and the photoplay. At the
time the financing agreement is executed, the producer usually has
as his only asset the motion picture right or a screenplay which
may be completed or in the process of being written; in practice,
even the completed screenplay is not copyrighted.3 9 Therefore, al-
though the Copyright Office might record this financing agreement,
such recordation would have no effect because of the inapplicability
of the Copyright Act to those works. A creditor would thus have
to avail himself of state filing provisions. However, even if he
perfected his interest by state filing, the creditor would not be
adequately protected because the producer might decide either to
copyright the screenplay under the Copyright Act (provided it was
completed), or to publish the screenplay thereby extinguishing the
common-law copyright as well as the security interest in it. The
producer could then convey to a purchaser who, absent knowledge
of the prior security agreement, would prevail against a creditor
who had the security interest in the screenplay before it was copy-
righted. If, on the other hand, state filing laws were to apply to a
statutory copyright, this problem would not arise since a subsequent
purchaser or unsecured creditor would have constructive notice of
the security agreement. This would be true because the subsequent
purchaser, in examining the state files, would find the encumbrance
against the producer's property.
Unlike motion picture financing, mortgages -in common-law
copyrights or unfinished works are not practical because the value
of such works would be so speculative that no creditor would take
3 6 NmmER, COPYRIGHT § 123.2 (1963).
37 Bill § 18(e).
3817 U.S.C. § 2 (1952). Under a state system of security protection, no
problem would arise because of the ability to utilize the floating lien.39 Interview with Robert McKean, Esq., partner, Simpson, Thatcher and
Bartlett, in New York City, July, 1964.
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a security interest in them. Instead, the creditor would probably
look to other personalty of the author for collateral. A further
shortcoming of the inapplicability of section 30 to mortgaged
motion picture rights arises out of the legal distinction between the
protection of a creditor when the producer-debtor is an assignee
and when he is an exclusive licensee. Section 30 requires that
only an assignee file his assignment as a condition to its validity
against subsequent assignees. No filing is required to protect an
exclusive licensee and therefore, his creditor. In other words, if
the debtor is an assignee, the creditor is faced with the initial
question of whether section 30 applies to his mortgage. If the
debtor is a licensee, no such question exists since the creditor of a
licensee is protected against all subsequent transferees with respect
to the collateral. 40 However, the courts are divided as to whether
an assignee of a mere motion picture right is an "assignee" within
the meaning of section 30, or whether he is an exclusive licensee. 41
The effect upon the creditor is that the statutory shortcoming
coupled with judicial confusion creates an aura of uncertainty.
Similar statutory inadequacies exist with respect to the photo-
play. A photoplay cannot be copyrighted under the present Copy-
right Act until it is in its completed form. Therefore, the security
interest in each day's filming would have to be filed in a state
filing office. Again, as was the case with the screenplay, if the
producer copyrights the photoplay, the property is extinguished.
C. Copyright as Only Part of the Collateral
In a practical setting, where a copyright is given as collateral,
the copyright would be only one of several assets which constitute
the security. If federal filing is exclusive, the secured party would
be confronted with the problem of whether he could file a security
agreement in which the copyright is not the sole collateral. Although
a state filing office would probably record such an instrument, since
state law would at least be applicable to the non-copyright collateral,
40 Since filing is not a condition to the validity of a transfer of a copy-
right license, the prior mortgagee of a copyright license has a prior right
as against the world.41 Among the cases which hold that a transfer of any part of a copyright
is a license and not an assignment, see, e.g., Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v.
Howells Sales Co., 282 Fed. 9 (2d Cir. 1922); Misbourne Pictures Ltd. v.
Johnson, 90 F. Supp. 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd, 189 F2d 774 (2d Cir.
1951). For cases inferring that the transfer is an assignment, see, e.g.,
Public Ledger v. New York Times, 275 Fed. 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff'd,
279 Fed. 747 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 627 (1922); Fitch v. Young,
230 Fed. 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). See generally NimMER, op. cit. sepra note
36, at 119; Kaminstein, Divisibility of Copyrights, (Copyright Revision No.
11, 1960) SUmcoMM. ON PATENTS, TRADE ApU cS & COPYRIGHTS, SEN.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1960).
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it is questionable whether the Copyright Office would accept for
filing such a security device. This problem would become more
acute if the copyright was not the primary collateral, and this is
usually the case.4 2 Even if both the state filing office and the
Copyright Office record this security interest, most of the problems
would not be solved. One such problem would be the possible
difference of durations for perfection.43  Another is the possible
cumbersome requirements of foreclosing. This would be especially
true if it were deemed that only the federal courts had jurisdiction
to foreclose the mortgage. 44 Even if federal jurisdiction were not
exclusive, it would still entail an unjustifiable burden to foreclose
since the issues of proper perfection and relative priorities would
have to be decided with respect to both statutes.
D. Difficulties Posed by the Proposed Act
Under the proposed act many of the above problems would be
eliminated. Since the common-law copyright in unpublished works
has been pre-empted by the protection of the act,4" a secured
creditor's interest in the screenplay would be protected even if the
producer decided to copyright it, provided that the agreement is
filed in the Copyright Office. The uncertainty that existed with
respect to the secured creditor's interest in the movie rights would
also appear to be eliminated. The proposed act provides that the
ownership of any of the copyright may be transferred in part46 and
that ownership of any of the particular rights which comprise the
copyright is entitled to protection.4 7 Under section 18 any transfer
of copyright ownership may be recorded and, if so recorded, is
entitled to the immunities that recordation offers.
However, even the proposed act does not appear to answer
all the questions that may be raised with respect to copyright
security financing. Since the field is one of constant development,
the future probably holds new challenges perhaps not envisaged
by the drafters of the proposed act, even after years of research.
One example of the proposed act's failure to cope with a
developing problem is its ambiguous treatment of the security device
known as the "pledge." A pledge is a security device whereby the
debtor conveys to the creditor the personalty but not the title
42 Either the accounts receivable, the inventory or the equipment will
usually constitute the primary collateral. Interview with Jack Raskin, Esq.,
partner, Weil, Gotchal & Manges, in New York City, July, 1964.
43 State filing laws have a provision which limit the time in which a
filing will constitute perfection of the security agreement. The Copyright
Act has no such provision.
54 See text accompanying notes 87-90 infra.
41 Bill § 19 (a).
46 Bill § 14(d) (1).
47Bill § 14(d) (2).
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thereto, as security for the debt.48 Since the copyright is an in-
tangible, the problem arises as to how one may convey possession
of a copyright itself, without also conveying the title to it. The
only possible way to do so would be by a writing which states that
possession is in the creditor while title remains in the debtor.
However, before thought is given to the manner of pledging copy-
rights, it must be determined whether a copyright can indeed be
pledged within the meaning of applicable law. Because section 28
does not include in its list of feasible transfers the ability to pledge
a copyright, there exists some uncertainty as to whether such a
device is feasible.49 Although cases involving the copyright as the
subject of a pledge are not available for reference, several cases
exist in which a patent was so used.50 In none of these cases, how-
ever, did the court consider the actual question of whether a patent
was pledgeable. 51
If it be concluded that section 28 of the present act or section
14(d) (1) of the proposed act impliedly permits the pledge of a
copyright, several problems might be raised which are similar to
those confronting the mortgagee of a copyright: the pledgee would
have to decide which filing system, state or federal, is determinative;
and if federal filing is controlling, whether he could file a writing
which constitutes a pledge and what effect such recordation would
have; and if state filing is determinative, whether local law con-
siderations must be taken into account.
The Code has eliminated the traditional form distinctions
among the various security devices. In their place it has created
a single security device called a "security interest. '52  One form
of a traditional security device which has been specifically in-
corporated into the Code's "security interest" is the pledge.53 The
concept of a pledge-possession of the personalty by the creditor
and the retention of title by the debtor has, however, been retained.
While the Code provides that a security interest can be perfected
48 1 JONES, op. cit. supra note 23, § 4.
49 Kaplan, supra note 16, at 258.50 Western Battery & Supply Co. v. Hazlett Storage Battery Co., 61
F.2d 220 '(8th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 608 (1933) ; Westmoreland
Specialty Co. v. Hogan, 167 Fed. 327 (3d Cir. 1909).
51 Although the nature of the patent and the copyright as intangibles
is the same, the alienability provisions of the Patent Act differ from
that in the Copyright Act. While § 28 of the Copyright Act lists the various
methods of transfer, § 261 of the Patent Act, whose title is "Ownership;
Assignment," states that: "subject to the provisions of this title, patents
shall have the attributes of personal property." Therefore, since there is
no express limitation against the pledging of a patent it can be concluded
that the provision impliedly allows pledging. This cannot be said of the
corresponding copyright provisions.
52 UCC § 9-101, comment.
53 UCC § 9-102(2).
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by possession of the collateral by the creditor,. ' a reading of section
9-305, and its official comments discloses that the general intangible
is one of those classes of collateral where possession by the creditor
will not constitute perfection.-I The comments explain that the only
way to perfect a security interest in a general intangible is by
filing.50 Thus, if state law is determinative, there can be no pledge
-as that term is understood-of copyrights, and the question of
whether the Copyright Act permits pledging becomes moot.
Uniform Commercial Code
Although the purpose 6f Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code is to set up a comprehensive, organized scheme for the
regulation of secured transactions,5" it does not offer legal certainty
as to the rights of a creditor who takes as his collateral a copyright.
In fact, it tends to further confuse the area.
Section 9-104 states that:
This article does not apply
a) to a security interest subject to any statute of the United States such
as the Ship Mortgage Act, 1920, to the extent that such statute
governs the rights of parties to and third parties affected by transac-
tions in particular types of property ...
Article 9, therefore, does not apply to security interests in
copyrights to the extent that sections 28 and 30 govern the rights
of the parties to the transaction and the effect of the transaction
upon third parties. Since the question as to the comprehensiveness
of sections 28 and 30 has not been resolved, the secured creditor's
position is left in a legal limbo. The comments to section 9-104,
although attempting to resolve the problem, offer little solace to the
creditor. The comment states that:
Although the Federal Copyrights Act contains provisions permitting the
mortgage of a copyright and for the recording of an assignment of a
6 UCC §§ 9-302(1) (a), 9-305.
DGUCC § 9-305, comment.
55 The standard form motion picture financing agreement, which is filed,
provides that the debtor shall hold the photoplay as trustee for the creditor
as though the creditor was a pledgee-in-possession. Although the Code does
not discuss the effect that a filed security agreement which provides for the
pledging of the intangible collateral will have, the comments to § 9-305 in-
validate the use of the above clause in a security agreement. The comment
states that the debtor cannot qualify as an agent for the secured party in
order that perfection be obtained by possession.
5 UCC § 9-101, comment. This is not a comprehensive discussion of
article 9. Such a task is beyond the scope of this paper. The purpose of
the discussion is merely to highlight some of the advantages and disadvantages
of the Code as it pertains to copyrights.
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copyright (17 USC 28,30) such a statute would not seem to contain
sufficient provisions regulating the rights of the parties and third parties
to exclude security interests in copyrights from the provisions of this
Article. [Emphasis added.]
This statement is not very illuminating since the use of the word
"seem" tends to show that the Code's sponsors do not know to
what extent sections 28 and 30 exclude the provisions of article 9.
The effect of the Code on transactions in which the copyright
is part of the collateral is further complicated by section 9-302(3)
which provides:
The filing provisions of this Article do not apply to a security interest
in property subject to a statute
a) of the United States which provides for a national registration or
filing of all security interests in such property....
The official comments to this section include sections 28 and 30 as
examples of federal statutes encompassed by the section. Therefore,
to the degree that section 9-104 does not exclude the applicability
of the Code to a security interest in copyrights, the secured creditor
would have to contend with section 9-302.
To what extent the Code will be applicable to secured trans-
actions involving the copyright will, therefore, depend upon the
degree to which the Copyright Act applies. There are three possible
systems which can exist: (1) control by state law only, to the
exclusion of any federal regulation; (2) a dual system in which
federal filing is necessary for perfection but all other aspects of
secured transactions are governed by state law; and (3) pre-
emption of the entire area by the Copyright Act. The following
will, therefore, be a discussion of the Code's applicability under
each of these systems.
A. Exclusive State System of Security Protection
If it is determined that the reference to mortgages in section
28 is merely permissive and that section 30 is not applicable to
mortgages 58 then the state laws pertaining to secured transactions
would govern. The first thing that should be noted, if it is deter-
mined that the above is true, is that section 28 requires that there
be an instrument in writing signed by the proprietor of the copy-
rights. However, since section 9-203 requires for the validity of a
non-possessory security interest a writing, a security agreement and
the signature of the debtor, compliance with the Code will be
compliance with the federal requirement. 59 However, the appli-
5s See text accompanying notes 2-6 supra.
59 See discussion supra, involving pledges, as to whether there can be a
possessory perfection of a security interest without there being a writing
which is signed by the debtor-proprietor.
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cability or inapplicability of section 9-302(3) (a) is not as easily
resolved. A literal reading of the section seems to say that if
the property is subject to a federal statute which provides for the
filing of a security interest in such property, then the filing provi-
sions of article 9 are not applicable. Therefore, since the Copyright
Act does provide for a national registration system, even though
under our premise sections 28 and 30 do not provide for the
federal filing of a security interest in a copyright, the filing provi-
sions of the Code are inapplicable. This result would be incon-
gruous and the proper meaning of section 9-302(3) (a) would seem
to be that, to the extent that the Copyright Act does not regulate
the recording of copyright transfers, the filing provisions of article
9 are applicable. 0
Unlike the Copyright Act, the Code expressly enables the
parties to a secured transaction to take advantage of modern
practical financing provisions.6 ' The ability to utilize these pro-
visions will help facilitate commercial financing, especially in the
motion picture industry. Two such provisions which can effectively
be incorporated in the security agreement are the after-acquired
property clause and the future advance clause. The after-acquired
property clause operates so that collateral, whenever acquired,
shall secure the obligations covered by the security agreement.
6 2
Under a future advance clause the collateral described in the
security agreement will cover any advances or other value given
by the secured creditor in the future.63 The incorporation of
60 See SPivAx, SECURED TRANSACTioNS 65 (1963).
601Some examples of these provisions are: §9-110 which provides for
flexible rules of description of the collateral and §§9-306(1), (4) which
provide for a simple, yet effective means of protecting "proceeds"; see also§ 9-102, comment, with regard to the classification of the various types of
collateral.
62 UCC § 9-204(3). The ability to incorporate such a provision in the
security agreement is important in motion picture financing since the copy-
right will not come into existence until some time after the security interest
has been perfected.
In order that the interest in the after-acquired property not be considered
to be taken for an antecedent debt two tests must be met:
1) The secured party must, at the inception of the transaction, have
given new value in some form,
2) The after-acquired property must have been received either (a) in the
ordinary course of the debtor's business, or (b) by acquisition pur-
suant to a contract entered into within' a reasonable time after the
giving of new value and pursuant to the security agreement. UCC§ 9-108, comment.
8 UCC § 9-204(5). The importance of the floating lien can be shown
from an examination of motion picture financing. When the financing agree-
ment is executed, the producer usually does not own any copyrights; however,
he does have an expectant copyright in the motion picture when it is finally
completed. It is the ability of the security agreement to attach as collateral
the copyright in the motion picture, upon which the secured creditor relies
when he enters into the agreement.
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these two provisions into the security agreement will create a
"cross-security" under which collateral acquired at any time may
secure advances whenever made.6
The problem now presents itself as to whether the financing
agreement should be filed.65 Since the copyright is an intangible
which is not represented by a symbolic document, a transfer of
which would constitute a transfer of the copyright, the place in
which to file the financing statement requires a special rule. Section
9-103(2) attempts to solve the problems caused by the nature
of the copyright by providing that filing should be accomplished in
the state where the debtor has his chief place of business.68
Another benefit to be derived from article 9 is the ability
to commingle the collateral under a single security agreement.67
The fact that the nature of the individual items constituting
the collateral is different does not complicate the filing procedure.
The secured creditor does not have to determine the category
of collateral to which a particular item belongs; he need only
describe the individual item constituting the collateral in his financing
statement.68 Since in commercial practice the copyright will con-
stitute only part of the collateral, this unified concept will have
an important effect on secured transactions, particularly motion
picture financing. The fact that the collateral may consist of
general intangibles, equipment,69 inventory, 0 contract rights, 7' and
accounts receivable,7 2 will, however, create a problem as to which
jurisdiction's laws are applicable and therefore, where to file the
agreement. Although the location where the debtor has his chief
place of business will determine the jurisdiction applicable to the
general intangible, in the case of equipment and inventory the
64UCC § 9-204, comment
65 Filing is necessary for the perfection of the security interest UCC
§9-302; see §§9-301(1)(b) and 9-312(5) in regard to the priority of an
unperfected security interest; § 9-402(1) in regard to the provisions necessary
to be included in the filing statement (financing statement); and § 9-403 in
regard to the duration of perfection after filing.
" Although "chief place of business" is not defined by the Code, in
practice it would mean where the debtor would expect the financing statement
to be filed.
Whether the Code itself is applicable will also depend on whether the
debtor's chief place of business is within the jurisdiction of a state that
has enacted the Code. If the state in which the debtor's chief place of
business is located has enacted the Uniform Commercial Code, then perfection
in that state will constitute perfection in any other state which also uses
the Code. See UCC § 9-103, comment.67 UCC § 9-102.
68 Coogan, How To Create Security Interests Under The Code - And
Why, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 131, 158 (1962).
69 UCC § 9-109 (2).7 
oUCC § 9-109(4).71 UCC § 9-106.72 Ibid.
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jurisdiction which controls is the one in which the equipment and
inventory are located.73  On the other hand, ie jurisdiction in
which the debtor keeps his records will determine the law applicable
to the security interest in the contract rights and the accounts re-
ceivable.74 Considering the general intangible, the equipment, and
the inventory, the problem is not acute since, in the case of the
motion picture, the equipment and the inventory will be located
at the place where the picture is being made. If the picture is
not being made in the state where the debtor has his chief place
of business, then all the secured creditor need do is file a financing
statement in the jurisdiction where the motion picture is being
made and in the state where the debtor has his principal place
of business. 5 However, with respect to the contract rights and
the accounts receivable, the problems are not as easily resolved.
Often, national publishers and movie distributors maintain regional
offices which keep the records for the region in which they are
located.76 In order to protect himself the secured creditor would
thus have to file in many jurisdictions. The problem is further
complicated, with respect to the motion picture industry, since at
the inception of the -security agreement there are no accounts
receivable; therefore, the after-acquired property clause would be
applicable only to those accounts receivable kept in the debtor's
chief place of business.7
7
If an author or proprietor of a copyright sells the copyright
but retains a security interest in it until the full purchase price
is paid, or a creditor advances monies to a debtor in order that
the debtor may acquire rights in or the use of collateral,78 a
special form of secured transaction, known as a purchase money
security interest, is created.79 The purchase money security interest
is entitled to certain privileges and priorities that the normal
security interest will not have. One such benefit that inures to
a secured creditor with a purchase money security interest is the
ability to take priority over a prior security interest which has
an after-acquired property clause. If the secured party files his
purchase money security interest within the ten-day grace period,
he will have priority with respect to the particular collateral which
73 UCC § 9-103.
74 Ibid.
75 In the case of the publishing company, the location of these items is
also ascertained with ease.
76 Coogan, supra note 68, at 171.
77 If the secured creditor so desires he can file a financing statement
before the security interest attaches in those states which have enacted the
Code. UJCC § 9-402.
78 An example of this type of transaction occurs when a creditor advances
money to a movie proddcer in order that the producer may purchase either
the copyright or the movie rights on which he might already have an option.
79 UCC § 9-107.
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the purchase money security interest secures as against a prior
secured party with an after-acquired property clause.8 0
Upon .default by the debtor, the satisfaction of the debt by
the sale of the copyright will create special problems.8 ' The Copy-
right Act requires that all transfers are to be signed by the
proprietor.8 2  If the proprietor refuses to assign his rights to
either the secured creditor or to a purchaser from the secured
creditor, then such secured creditor is confronted with the problem
of whether someone else can sign for the debtor-proprietor. This
problem was resolved by the Supreme Court in the case of
Ager v. Murray.8 3 The Court held that a patent or copyright
could be subjected by judicial proceedings to the payment of the
debts of the proprietor 84 and that if the proprietor refused to
execute an assignment, the court could appoint a trustee to do
0.88
5
Another provision of article 9 that will be advantageous
to the secured creditor if the debtor defaults is section 9-504(3).
This section permits the disposition of a particular collateral to be
in a unit or in parcels. Therefore, with regard to the copyright,
the secured creditor could convey the various units which con-
stitute the copyright-the motion picture rights, publishing rights,
live performance rights, etc.-individually and would not have
to resort to the sale of the whole copyright.8  In this way the
secured creditor would be able to realize a greater return than
would be possible by a single sale.
B. Federal Law Exclusive Only as to Filing
Although an exclusive state filing system for copyright
mortgages offers many benefits that a federal filing system cannot
offer, it does create several problems. One such problem is
8 oUCC § 9-312(4). Another advantage that a purchase money security
interest holder has is a limited priority over a bulk transferee and a lien
creditor, §9-302(2). However, no benefit occurs as against a subsequent
assignee or secured party who files first, § 9-312, comment. If the collateral
is inventory then the purchase money secured party must give notification,
pursuant to §§ 9-312(3)(b) and (c), in order to prevail as against a prior
secured party whose security agreement contained an after-acquired property
clause.
81 For the general simplified default procedure, see §§ 9-503, 9-504.
8217 U.S.C. §28 (1952).
83 105 U.S. 126 (1881).
84 Id. at 128.
85d. at 132. See also Gillett v. Bate, 86 N.Y. 87 (1881); Pacific Bank
v. Robinson, 57 Cal. 520 (1881).
81 Although, under the proposed Copyright Act the ability to sell divisible
parts of the copyright is expressly provided for (§ 14(d) (1)), it is ques-
tionable under the present act whether such a sale is feasible, and if feasible,
to what extent is it practical.
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caused by the inherent nature of the copyright itself. The rights
in the copyright inure to the proprietor by reason of the fact that
his name is recorded in the Copyright Office as owner of the
copyright. Therefore, the secured creditor would have to check
with the Copyright Office to ascertain whether the debtor is the
proprietor of the copyright. This, however, is not a cumbersome
task for the secured creditor. What does create a problem is the
inability of the secured creditor to prevent a subsequent bona fide
assignee from destroying the secured creditor's security by filing
his assignment in the Copyright Office. The only feasible way
in which the secured party can protect himself is by filing some
form of paper with the Copyright Office that will constitute notice
to a subsequent assignee.87
This leads us back to the problem first considered in this
paper, as to what the effect of filing a mortgage of a copyright
would have. Although the proposed Copyright Act would permit
the secured creditor to file his security agreement with the Copy-
right Office so as to put a subsequent assignee on notice of his
interest, it does not seem to be sufficiently broad in regard to
protection and remedies so as to exclude article 9.88 The following,
therefore, will be a discussion of the applicability of the Code
to a security interest which is filed pursuant to a federal filing
statute.
In order that the secured creditor may take advantage of
the various Code provisions, the Copyright Office must allow the
recording of any security agreement in which some part of the
collateral is or may be a copyright. Therefore, the Copyright
Office would have to record security agreements in which the
copyright is not the primary collateral, and security agreements
in which the present collateral does not include a copyright but
does have an after-acquired property clause. 9
If the Copyright Office will record any of these security
agreements, then the creditor will have no problems as to the
perfection of his security interest in the copyright under the Code,
since filing under the Copyright Act will constitute perfection
pursuant to section 9-302(4). In any event, the secured party
will still have to file the same security agreement pursuant to
the applicable provisions of article 9 in order that his security
87 In the alternative, it is possible that a court if confronted with this
problem would hold that the assignee was under an added obligation to
search the state files. However, such a holding is improbable since § 3&)
makes no such inference.
UCC § 9-104.
89 The ability to effectively file a security agreement with an after-acquired
property clause is extremely important where it is foreseeable that the debtor
will obtain a copyright.
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interest in the other collateral will be perfected too.90 Once the
filings have been accomplished, all the rights and remedies dis-
cussed in the previous section will be applicable with equal force
to all the collateral.
C. Exclusive Federal System
If it is determined that the present or proposed Copyright
Acts exclude state law entirely, the feasibility of using the copy-
right as collateral would be commercially impractical. Such a
determination would completely exclude the applicability of any
of the provisions of article 9.91 Where filing was within the federal
cognizance, the provisions of the security agreement, as well as the
rights and privileges of the secured creditor were the same, ir-
respective of the type of collateral. The same would not be true
under an exclusive federal system which completely excludes
article 9. Some examples of the inadequacies of both the present
and proposed Copyright Acts are that they have insufficient pro-
visions: for perfection; 92 for creating an effective security interest
prior to the creation of a copyright; 93 for utilizing the after-
acquired property clause, the future advance clause, and the cross-
security; for protection against the wrongful use of the collateral
by the debtor; for restricting the debtor-proprietor in his use of
his copyright by the security agreement; and for an easy means of
satisfaction upon default by the debtor.
Since the present Copyright Act does not apply either to
uncompleted works or completed unpublished works which have
not been federally copyrighted, a security interest in these rights,
for whatever value it might have,9 4 would be subject entirely to
article 9.
Jurisdiction of Disputes Involving Copyright Mortgages
As we have seen, the question of whether state filing or
federal filing is determinative must be resolved. Such a determina-
tion, however, does not resolve the question of whether the federal
or state courts have jurisdiction to judge disputes involving copy-
right mortgages. The fact that the Republic Pictures case held
90This is so since §§ 9-302(3) and (4) exempt only the property subject
to the federal filing statute.
91 UCC § 9-104.
2 See discussion supra involving the inadequacy of the grace period.
93 It is possible that under the proposed act this problem would be
eliminated since the act will be applicable to the common-law copyright
as it exists today.
94 The collateral would be extinguished upon either publication or statutory
copyrighting.
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that foreclosure of copyright mortgages is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of state courts should not preclude a consideration of
which court system, federal or state, has or should have
jurisdiction.95
Courts presented with this problem will not have to rely
solely on the Republic decision since there have been several other
cases where the issue was before the court. One such instance
was in the case of Keiper v. Amkco.9 6 In his decision sustaining
the argument that the state courts had jurisdiction to foreclose
a patent mortgage Judge Van Voorhis stated:
The contention that the Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of the
action on the ground that it involves a patent is untenable. This is an
action to foreclose a mortgage upon a patent and does not involve its validity.
Both parties here concede that the patent is valid, and the action arises
under the mortgage and not under the Federal patent law. (Emphasis
added.)
In another case the plaintiff instituted proceedings in the Supreme
Court of New York County claiming that title to certain copy-
rights should be vested in him. After the court decided adversely,
he instituted an infringement action in the federal courts.
However, the federal court dismissed the complaint stating that
the state court was acting within its "jurisdictional competency." 7
It is also interesting to note that the state court opinion noted that
the chattel mortgage of the copyright was filed in the New York
County Register's Office and was foreclosed by a state proceeding.9 8
If the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction it must be
predicated upon Sections 28 and 30 of the Copyiight Act read in
conjunction with Section 1338(a) of the Judiciary Act.99 Section
28, in listing the various methods by which a copyright may be
transferred, includes assignments, grants, and bequests by will, as
well as mortgages. If this section confers jurisdiction upon the
federal courts, pursuant to Section 1338(a) of the Judiciary Act,
to adjudicate copyright mortgage actions, then this same section
should, by the same reasoning, confer jurisdiction upon the federal
courts where the action involves an assignment, grant, or a bequest
by will of a copyright. We know that this is not the case. The
courts have repeatedly held that issues involving assignments,
grants, and bequests by will, of copyrights are exclusively within
95 The United States Supreme Court has not as yet considered this problem
and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's decision is technically con-
trolling only within that circuit. The exhaustive decision of Judge Yankwich
might also tend to delineate the effectiveness of the court of appeals' decision
if the problem was before another court without the Ninth Circuit.
96 174 Misc. 211, 20 N.Y.S.2d 480 (Sup. Ct 1940).
97 Dorf v. Denton, 17 F. Supp. 531, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
0 Greenberg v. Denton (Spec. Term N.Y. County Feb. 27, 1936).
*928 U.S.C. §1338(a) (1959).
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the jurisdiction of state courts.10 0 As Circuit Judge Goodrich noted
in his opinion in Republic, the mere fact that the right is derived
from federal law does not of itself confer jurisdiction upon the
federal courts.1' 1  In fact, application of the converse of the
reasoning used above indicates that state courts have jurisdiction
of copyright mortgage actions.10 2
The problem as to which court system has jurisdiction to
adjudicate foreclosures of copyright mortgages has, in part, been
caused by the intangible nature of the copyright itself. The
early decisions, upon which some attorneys and judges still rely,
exemplify the difficulty in foreclosing mortgages on intangibles.
This is due to the in rem nature of a foreclosure action, which
requires the court to obtain jurisdiction over the parties and
the property in order to render an effective judgment. 03
Judge Yankwich was confronted with these problems in the
Republic Pictures case and chose to resolve them in the light
of the older cases. However, one month after Judge Yankwich's
decision the Supreme Court, in the case of Standard Oil Co. v.
New fersey,104 stated:
where the debtor and creditor are within the jurisdiction of a court, that
court has constitutional power to deal with the debt. Since choses in action
have no spatial or tangible existence, control over them can "only arise from
control or power over the persons whose relationship are the source of the
rights and obligations."'10 5
100 See, e.g., Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S. 496 (1926) ; Bobbs-Merrill
Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908); Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics,
Inc., 315 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1963); Wells v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 166
F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1948) ; Globe Steel Abrasive Co. v. National Metal Abrasive
Co., 101 F2d 489 (6th Cir. 1939).
101Republic Pictures Corp. v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 197 F.2d 767,
769-70 (9th Cir. 1952). He supports this conclusion by citing to ample
authorities. Id. at 770 n.4.
102 The history of the Ship Mortgage Act is a good analogy to support
this provision. Although the present Ship Mortgage Act has elaborate pro-
visions describing the conditions under which the federal courts will havejurisdiction, the previous act merely provided that a mortgage was not valid
against a subsequent bona fide purchaser unless recorded. Under numerous
cases decided under the old act, courts consistently held that the provisions
of that act did not confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts. See, e.g.,
Detroit Trust Co. v. The Borlum, 293 U.S. 21 (1934); The J. E. Rumbell,
148 U.S. 1 (1892).
1033 FREEMAN, Jur.-,mENTs § 1520 (5th ed. 1933); see Stevens v. Gladding,
58 U.S. (17 How.) 447, 451 (1854) for a good example of early judicial
difficulties with this concept.
104 341 U.S. 428 (1951); see also Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 312 (1949).105 Id. at 439. The Court continued by stating that the "situs of an in-
tangible is fictional but control over parties whose judicially coerced action
can make effective rights created by the chose in action enables the court
with such control to dispose of the rights of the parties to the intangible."
Id. at 439-40.
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Although the Standard Oil case did not deal with copyrights,
the statements made by the Court as to intangibles are certainly
applicable to copyrights. Based upon the Standard Oil rationale
and the fact that state courts are competent tribunals for the
determination of assignments and titles to copyrights, 06 it appears
logically consistent that state courts are the proper forums for copy-
right mortgage foreclosure.
Conclusion
The copyright has until recently been predominantly used
by those in the entertainment industry. However, today other
commercial enterprises are realizing the value of copyrighting. The
toy industry, the game industry, and any of the many industries
which utilize designs, such as the clothing or container industries
are beginning to take advantage of the copyright laws. These
businesses, especially the smaller ones, might find it very desirable
to offer a copyright as collateral. However, if a creditor is going
to accept the copyright as security, then the copyright must be
readily marketable and the security interest in the copyright must
be capable of adequate perfection.
If the lack of decisional law is a forecast of the impracticality
of mortgaging the copyright, it is due to the ambiguity in the law
and not to any inadequacy of the copyright as personalty.
)X
TnE SECURITiES ACTS AmENDMENTS OF 1964: EFFECT ON THE
OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKET
The diversity and lack of organization of the over-the-counter
markets have continuously perplexed those seeking to regulate
them. The framers of the Securities Exchange Act stated that
both the exchange and the over-the-counter markets were "affected
with a national public interest." I However, the Act of 1934,
while subjecting the exchange markets to detailed regulation,
did not provide like provisions for the over-the-counter markets.
Rather, it granted to the Securities and Exchange Commission broad
rule-making power in relation to the over-the-counter market,
without, however, providing any guidelines for the exercise of
106 See cases cited note 100 .supra.
I Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 78b
(1958).
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